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TRENDS IN COMMUNIST

PROPAGANDA

1 OF 1

1 AUG 1973

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
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TRENDS

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


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1 AUGUST 1973
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CHINA

LOW-KEY RECEPTION MARKS ARMY DAY; NO EDITORIAL OR SPEECH

Army Day has been added to the anniversary celebrations that have been markedly scaled down in the wake of the 1971 Lin Piao affair. The occasion was marked this year by the usual anniversary eve reception on 31 July, but there was only a modest leadership turnout, there was no reception speech, and no joint editorial was issued on 1 August. Notable absentees were Chou En-lai, who left Peking on 31 July to accompany the visiting Congo president on a trip to the northeast, and Chiang Ching and Yao Wen-yuan, both absent for the first time since 1969. Chou last failed to appear on this occasion in 1968. The turnout this year evidently reflected the move to low-key observances rather than indicating leadership conflict or the press of urgent business. A purposeful attempt to downgrade the observance is suggested by the absence of party elders Tung Pi-wu and Chu Te, who headed the leader rankings last year and who would not be expected to play a major role in leadership deliberations.

Last year's full-scale celebration of Army Day now ranks as an exception to the pattern of low-key observances set by National Day celebrations in October 1971 immediately following Lin's downfall. The 1972 PLA anniversary occasioned a turnout of all active Peking-based Politburo members, a major reception speech by Yeh Chien-ying, and a joint editorial in PEOPLE'S DAILY, RED FLAG, and LIBERATION ARMY DAILY. The special treatment of Army Day last year was evidently designed to demonstrate a return to normal party-army relations, with the army in full good graces under party leadership.

In lieu of a major speech, this year's reception was highlighted by a brief series of toasts by Yeh Chien-ying, who followed last year's pattern in toasting Mao as "the founder and commander" of the PLA. He also toasted the "friendship of the peoples of all countries in the world," but he did not repeat his toast last year to the "victories of the anti-imperialist revolutionary struggles of the peoples of the world." According to NCNA's account, a band played "The People's Army Is Loyal to the Party" and another song celebrating the army's discipline. PEOPLE'S DAILY greeted the anniversary with several slogans and Mao quotations and a large picture of Mao wearing a military uniform.

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PEKING DISCOUNTS SOVIET-U.S. "TEMPORARY COMPROMISE"

The subdued treatment of Army Day removed the customary policy statement on the occasion, but Peking has recently offered its first substantive comment on the June Soviet-U.S. summit and has also made its first allusion to the Watergate affair. In a major speech on 28 July, Chou En-lai discounted the "temporary compromise" achieved by the two superpowers and went on to voice Peking's portrayal of an "expansionist" Soviet Union. On the next day, NCNA disseminated an article that seems to discount the effect of Watergate developments on improved Sino-U.S. relations. Taken together, Peking's reactions appear to signal a determination to press its rivalry with the Soviet Union while continuing to promote better relations with the United States. In his speech, delivered at a banquet honoring the visiting Congo president, Chou demanded that the United States end its military actions in Cambodia, but the thrust of his remarks was directed at expressing solidarity with Sihanouk's front rather than joining issue with Washington.*

Chou did not refer expressly to the Nixon-Brezhnev summit and avoided naming either the United States or the Soviet Union in the passage of his speech dealing with "the hegemonism and power politics practiced by the superpowers." He in effect dismissed their recent agreements by stressing the "ceaselessly intensifying" contention between the superpowers while taking derisive note of their "temporary compromise and collusion." In a metaphor reflecting Peking's assessment of the Soviet-U.S. summit, Chou said it is a case of "same beds, different dreams" which will not change either power's effort to overcome the other. Chou's reference to collusion was rather acidulous, perhaps reflecting Chinese distaste toward the Nixon-Brezhnev meeting, but the brunt of his attack was borne by the Soviets. Thus he said that "one of the superpowers, in order to supplant the other, is reaching out its grasping hand everywhere," even "brazenly taking part in the dismemberment of sovereign states." Chou claimed that this superpower is "increasingly revealing its expansionist features" by the growing number of its evil deeds.

In recent weeks Peking has been issuing a steady stream of reports designed to document this picture of Soviet expansionism and to

* See the Indochina section of the TRENDS.

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discount the signs of Soviet-U.S. detente. Thus NCNA on 26 July carried excerpts of articles in the London TIMES by Lord Chalfont, who has engaged in an exchange with a commentator in the Soviet military paper RED STAR over Chalfont's portrayal of a menacing Soviet military presence in Europe. NCNA quoted Chalfont as dismissing the Soviet-U.S. SALT agreements as little more than measures by the two superpowers to preserve the nuclear balance at a lower cost to themselves. In another characteristic use of proxy comment, NCNA on 29 July quoted extensively from an Australian communist organ to provide a global survey of aggressive Soviet behavior. Among other charges, NCNA cited one accusing the Soviets of massing more than a million troops along China's border "to try to carry out the dream of destroying" the PRC.

Peking's reaction to the June summit has been similar to that of a year earlier, except that the anti-Soviet line has been more pronounced this time than last year. On each occasion Peking carried a factual report on the summit and deferred comment until several weeks later. Last year, on 17 July, Chou took the occasion of a banquet honoring a Yemeni delegation to dismiss the strategic arms control agreements reached the previous May as marking the beginning of a new stage in the arms race. On that occasion, in notable contrast to his speech this July, Chou took an evenhanded approach toward the two superpowers rather than directing his attack mainly at the Soviets.

SINO-U.S. RELATIONS Peking used the vehicle of a report by a member of the PRC journalist delegation that recently visited the United States to make what appears to be its first allusion to the Watergate affair. NCNA's English service on 29 July carried excerpts of a 27 July article in the cultural paper KWANGMING DAILY recounting the signs of friendship accorded the delegation during its visit in May and June. The report concluded by quoting John Kenneth Galbraith as telling the delegation that "the great events now happening in the United States" would affect neither the American people's "affection" for the Chinese nor "the growing friendship between the two countries." It also cited Galbraith's expression of "esteem" for President Nixon's demarche toward Peking as well as his assertion that the American people's desire for improved relations with the PRC "would be necessarily considered by any American president."

NCNA's account of Galbraith's remarks, which were made to the delegation in late May, does not refer to Watergate explicitly. However, Peking's dissemination of this account on NCNA's English

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service seems to signal a desire to insulate improving Sino-U.S. relations from Watergate developments.

During its tour the journalist delegation had figured prominently in Peking's efforts to portray solid American support for the President's China policy. Most notably, a 29 May NCNA report on the President's "friendly" talk with the delegation that day quoted his pledge to continue working for closer ties and his assertion that "the overwhelming majority of the American people, regardless of their political persuasion, favor the initiative toward the PRC." The report also cited Dr. Kissinger's remarks to the group that "the main lines" of U.S. foreign policy are "fixed" and "enjoy bipartisan support," and that the policy of normalization with the PRC "will be pursued with energy and conviction in the years ahead."

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INDOCHINA

PRG, DRV CHARGE ALLIED OBSTRUCTION OF PARIS JOINT COMMUNIQUE

The failure to meet the timetable set out in the 13 June Paris communique prompted PRG and DRV foreign ministry statements castigating the United States as well as the Saigon government for alleged obstruction. The statements marked the passing of the 45-day deadline, on 28 July, for agreement on internal South Vietnam issues and the return of captured personnel. The PRG statement of 30 July called the United States the "main instigator and manipulator" of Saigon's alleged infringements of the Paris communique. It reproached Saigon for allegedly committing numerous cease-fire violations, for continuing to implement "the extremely cruel" pacification program, and for failing to guarantee "democratic freedoms." The United States was taken to task for failing to fulfill obligations undertaken toward the DRV involving minesweeping, air reconnaissance, and the DRV-U.S. economic discussions in Paris.

The failure to meet the 28 July deadline on the signing of a comprehensive agreement on internal affairs (along the lines propounded by the PRG at the consultative meetings held by the two South Vietnamese parties in Paris) is the result, according to the PRG statement, of Saigon's determination to prevent implementation of the January peace accord and the June communique. A Liberation Radio commentary broadcast the day the statement was issued accused the United States of encouraging Saigon to obstruct an agreement on general elections and the formation of a National Council of National Reconciliation and Concord.

The PRG statement also charged that Saigon failed to release on schedule "hundreds of thousands" of civilian prisoners. The joint communique signed in June calls upon the two South Vietnamese parties to "do their utmost" to insure the return of "captured personnel" by 28 July, but both protagonists maintain that the other side continues to hold thousands of prisoners.

The DRV Foreign Ministry statement, issued on 31 July, was similar in many respects to the PRG statement, but it did not accuse the United States of instigating Saigon's violations--instead it "sternly condemns and energetically denounces" the "maneuvers" of both the United States and Saigon. On the other hand, Hanoi's statement represents the first high-level expression of North Vietnamese concern about the implementation of the decision on minesweeping outlined in the joint communique. It maintained that the United States "has not fully carried out its obligations to clear up the mines that have become ineffective and to supply sufficient means for the DRV to sweep

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mines in its waterways." A Hanoi Vietnamese broadcast on 19 July reported the U.S. announcement that minesweeping operations had been completed but claimed that other "matters" related to mine-sweeping were still pending.

The DRV statement also charged that the United States "has not yet ceased immediately, completely and indefinitely its aerial reconnaissance" over North Vietnam. A DRV Foreign Ministry spokesman's statement on 25 July protested an alleged U.S. violation on 22 July. This was Hanoi's only claim of such an incident since the signing of the joint communique seven weeks ago; the communique prohibits such flights, a stipulation not specifically treated in the January peace agreement.

The United States was also accused of evading its obligation to contribute to postwar reconstruction in North Vietnam by delaying the formulation of an agreement at the meetings of the DRV-U.S. Joint Economic Commission, a body formed to implement Article 21 of the January peace agreement on postwar reconstruction. According to a statement issued by the DRV delegation to the commission on 25 July, the talks were "temporarily" suspended two days earlier to permit both sides to consult with their governments. The statement, however, implied that the talks were discontinued because "the U.S. Government delegation deliberately raised all kinds of obstructions" to prevent a satisfactory resolution of problems under discussion. The joint communique stipulates that "the first phase" of the commission's work was to have been completed by 3 July, a deadline that apparently passed without the achievement of results anticipated by Hanoi.

NCNA has carried the text of the PRG and DRV statements. TASS has carried brief summaries of the two statements, predictably omitting the portions sharply critical of the United States. In Peking's only authoritative comment on recent developments in Vietnam, a PEOPLE'S DAILY Commentator's article on 27 July criticized Saigon for failing to release prisoners expeditiously in accordance with the deadline. A Moscow radio "observer" on the same day also assailed Saigon for procrastinating on this issue. Neither Moscow nor Peking, however, has commented on the expiration of the deadline on reaching agreement on South Vietnamese internal matters or alleged failure of the United States to fulfill its obligations toward the DRV.

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CHOU REAFFIRMS STOCK SUPPORT FOR SIHANOUK'S CAUSE

Chou En-lai used the occasion of a 28 July banquet in honor of the visiting Congolese president to express general solidarity with Prince Sihanouk and the Cambodian insurgents. Chou's remarks comprise the first authoritative Chinese comment on the Cambodian situation in over three weeks. His comments on Cambodia, which were highlighted by a separate report transmitted by NCNA prior to accounts of his speech as a whole, were pegged in particular to the 21 July RGNU declaration issued by a landmark "national congress" held recently in the Cambodian "liberated zone" and directed to "friendly" countries and peoples. Chou noted that the RGNU has repeatedly declared that a Cambodian settlement must accord with Sihanouk's five points, but he directly associated Peking only with the demand for an end to the U.S. bombing and "all other acts of military intervention." Otherwise Chou's remarks were cautiously generalized in expressing Chinese support for the insurgents' "just struggle and their solemn and righteous stand" on a settlement.

Chou made a general observation that the struggle against "the traitorous Lon Nol clique" is winning "continuous new victories." More detailed Chinese coverage of the military situation has been carried in low-level reportage. Thus, a 28 July NCNA account of the recent Phnom Penh conscription decree reported that the government's forces had recently suffered heavy casualties and that people from all quarters are rising up against the regime. NCNA has replayed reports on the effectiveness of the insurgents' attacks despite U.S. bombing, including an Australian CP organ's observation that "complete victory for the heroic Cambodian people is near." Peking duly carried the text of the 21 July RGNU declaration along with much other front comment.

NCNA on 25 July reported that RGNU Prime Minister Penn Nouth left Peking that day for Tsingtao "to take a rest." With Sihanouk vacationing in Korea, the only high-level front leader who may be remaining in the Chinese capital is Ieng Sary, whose last public appearance was on 20 July to see off Sihanouk.

Hanoi also responded authoritatively to the RGNU declaration, issuing a foreign ministry statement on the 29th that, as in Chou's remarks, offered only generalized support for the insurgents' "aspirations for independence, peace, and neutrality" expressed in the 21 July statement. Typically, its only specific demand was that the United States end its bombing and interference so that the Cambodians can settle their own affairs.

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Unsurprisingly, there has been no Soviet response to the RGNU declaration, but Moscow has again taken note of Sihanouk's travels outside China. TASS on 22 July cited KCMA on the prince's arrival in Pyongyang, mentioning his title as head of the FUNK but not as head of state. A 25 July Radio Peace and Progress broadcast highlighted the insurgents' recent battle successes in noting that U.S. bombing has managed to deter an assault on Phnom Penh only because the insurgents fear the destruction of the city if they attack. A 30 July Radio Moscow commentary said that people in Phnom Penh are unwilling to help defend the regime and cited U.S. press observations on "the impossibility of saving the Phnom Penh regime."

FRONT COMMENT There has been a tapering off of the recent heavy output of authoritative pronouncements by the front, but occasional statements have underlined the insurgents' confidence over the military situation and their firm stand on a settlement. Sihanouk atypically did not refer to the Cambodian situation in a 28 July speech at a banquet in his honor in North Korea, but Penn Nouth, in a 24 July message to the in-country insurgents hailing the conclusion of the recent national congress, noted that the Lon Nol government has been "driven into a complete impasse" and is on "the verge of complete collapse." The message reaffirmed the insurgents' determination to struggle uncompromisingly to achieve Sihanouk's five points. An appeal by the three insurgent ministers on 25 July noted that the Phnom Penh regime "is entering the final stage," that its military, political, and economic position is in complete collapse, and that "even some officials in the Nixon Administration" are now dismissing the regime. Meanwhile, a 26 July editorial on the insurgents' radio provided a glimpse into their military intentions, noting for the first time in authoritative comment that the insurgents "in the near future" intend to assault Phnom Penh, making the city "a new battlefield" and a "contested town" between them and the Lon Nol forces.

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SOVIET BLOC RELATIONS

CRIMEA MEETING COMMUNIQUE LAUDS BREZHNEV'S DETENTE POLICIES

The communique issued at the end of the third annual summer conclave of Soviet bloc party leaders in the Crimea on 30-31 July was notable in recording agreement by the Romanians in two areas where they had previously been silent. As reported by TASS, the participants "unanimously" endorsed efforts "to coordinate actions in the international arena in the interests of socialism" and the consolidation of peace. In the past Bucharest has been wary about the coordination of East European foreign policy and has merely paid lip service--notably in the communique on the January 1972 Warsaw Pact summit meeting in Prague--to the principle of international "cooperation" among socialist countries in the quest for peace. The current communique also placed Bucharest on record in favor of Brezhnev's visits abroad and his "personal contribution" to peace. Bucharest media had previously carried only reports, without comment, of the Soviet leader's recent round of travel.

The communique adhered for the most part to Moscow's foreign policy positions--on European security, force reduction, the Middle East and Vietnam--and included a swipe at "forces" opposing international detente. For example, it called for strict observance of the Vietnam accord by all sides and avoided criticism of Saigon and Washington in this regard. However, in failing to mention China and in appealing for cooperation by communists of "all" countries, the communique represented a concession by Moscow to Bucharest.

No such concessions were evident at last year's Crimea meeting which Ceausescu also attended. Following that session, TASS issued a brief, generalized report indicating that there had been "a fruitful exchange of opinions" on building socialism and on further development of "all-round cooperation" among the socialist states, with identity of views on all questions discussed. By contrast, the first Crimea meeting, on 2 August 1971, which Ceausescu did not attend, had issued a detailed communique covering a wide range of issues. The 1971 meeting had been convened in the wake of Ceausescu's June visit to Peking and Romanian resistance to greater economic integration at the late July CEMA summit conference in Bucharest. The communique on that meeting had stressed the "mounting importance" of cooperation by socialist states based on "Marxism-Leninism and socialist internationalism."

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The Soviet delegation headed by Brezhnev included Foreign Minister Gromyko, and CPSU Secretaries Katushev and Ponomarev. All members of the Soviet delegation except Ponomarev participated in last year's Crimea meeting, which was also attended by Podgornyy.

The DRV party leader Le Duan, who has remained in the Soviet Union since the departure of the DRV delegation, did not attend the Crimea meeting, although a 29 July report by Moscow radio had hinted at this possibility. The report listed Le Duan together with Poland's Gierek, Czechoslovakia's Husak and Mongolia's Tsedenbal as having "already arrived in the USSR for a holiday"--the standard phrase used to announce the arrival of participants at the Crimea meeting. The participants at the three Crimea meetings, however, have all had organizational ties with Moscow through CEMA or the Warsaw Pact, or both.

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EAST - WEST RELATIONS

DETENTE POLICY DEFENDED AGAINST SKEPTICS AT HOME AND ABROAD

Apparently concerned to allay doubts and uncertainty at home and abroad about its recent foreign policy initiatives, Moscow has launched a major effort since the June summit to justify its policy of detente with the West, particularly its cultivation of improved relations with the United States. This effort appears aimed, on the one hand, at reassuring skeptics within the socialist community that detente does not derive from weakness, either economic or military, and that it does not conflict with support for revolutionary causes. On the other hand, it appears aimed at cautioning critics on the home front that Soviet foreign policy objectives cannot be attained through reliance on military power alone.

ARBATOV ARTICLE These aims can be discerned in an authoritative article by USA Institute head Georgiy Arbatov in the 22 July PRAVDA which highlights a continuing series of post-summit assessments of U.S.-Soviet relations. The basic outline of the article parallels earlier Arbatov articles following the Moscow summit and the Vietnam cease-fire agreement. In all three, he has argued that certain "objective" factors underlying the improvement in relations have given it a stable character. But he has continued to show more concern about the future course of the relationship than about past achievements. In this regard, he has analyzed with greater candor and at greater length than other Soviet commentators the obstacles to detente, particularly the continuing opposition within the United States.

Like other spokesmen, Arbatov maintained that the changing world balance of power in favor of the Soviet Union and its allies is the principal "objective" factor behind the improvement of relations with the United States. He had noted in his February KOMMUNIST article that this development--along with growing problems at home and abroad--had prompted U.S. leaders to recognize the futility of reliance on military power alone to achieve foreign policy objectives. In the current article, however, Arbatov's remarks appear to be aimed more at those in the Soviet Union who assert that the recent improvement in the international situation derives from Soviet military might and that future successes will depend mainly on the same factor. In response to such assertions, Arbatov defended the decisive contribution of the regime's foreign policy initiatives and warned that "power by itself does not guarantee peace and still less detente."

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To support his claim he posited an action-reaction syndrome in foreign affairs: "The growth of power at one pole can in the final analysis, as has happened quite often in the past, lead to attempts to build up power at the other--in other words, to unrestrained military rivalry leading to armed conflicts." And he noted that by waging a peace offensive at a time when the Soviet Union and its allies have acquired "greater power than at any time in the past," Moscow was eradicating the Western "myth" of an alleged Soviet military threat.

Arbatov may also have been addressing a domestic audience in arguing against the view that the benefits of expanded East-West trade will be one-sided and that Moscow is "counting on 'assistance' from the capitalist powers." PRAVDA's political commentator Yuriy Zhukov had countered similar views during one of his Moscow TV commentaries in early July, when he assured troubled viewers that foreign funding of major industrial projects would not constitute penetration of foreign capital into the Soviet economy.

Arbatov concluded his assessment of the current state of relations on a decidedly contingent note. While noting the possibility of a return to the cold war, he stressed that "major struggles and much work remain" before U.S.-Soviet relations can become a "constant factor for international peace."

BOVIN ARTICLE The most forthright response to those questioning the compatibility of detente and support for revolutionary causes appeared in an article by Aleksandr Bovin published in the 27 July NEW TIMES (No. 30) and reprinted in MOSKOVSKAYA PRAVDA of the 26th.* Bovin, an IZVESTIYA political commentator, pulled no punches in attacking those of "superficial mind" who "prefer the salutary simplicity of 'absolute' solutions," that is, either peaceful coexistence or proletarian internationalism. To illustrate the interplay between the two principles of Soviet policy, Bovin defended the decision to receive President Nixon in Moscow last year in the face of the U.S. blockade of North Vietnamese

* The Bovin article may be the same article which was reported in a 12 July Moscow radio broadcast to have appeared in IZVESTIYA that day, but which did not appear in any editions reaching the West. If this surmise is correct, it suggests that publication of the article was delayed for political reasons--perhaps concern for the sensitivities of the DRV leaders who were then in Moscow on an official visit.

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ports. He sympathized with the sentiments of those who felt that this "adventurist prank" should have ruined the Nixon visit, but asserted that "emotions are one thing and politics another." He then went on to describe the broader concerns of Soviet policy-making, particularly the "complexity" of "translating principles into the language of practical politics."

Moscow has also responded to doubts about other facets of its detente policy in recent weeks. In a domestic radio commentary on the 19th, Yuriy Kornilov, a TASS commentator who normally covers news on the agency's international services, went out of his way to defend the frequent displays of camaraderie by Soviet leaders toward their Western counterparts. Kornilov argued that in a transitional period from confrontation to cooperation international negotiations by specialists in foreign affairs must be supplemented by meetings of leaders "invested with the highest responsibility" in order to solve emerging problems. He went on to note the critical role of Brezhnev's meetings with the leaders of France, West Germany and the United States in placing Soviet relations with those countries on a new footing.

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FORCE REDUCTIONS

MOSCOW COMMENT LOW-KEYED ON U.S. CONGRESSIONAL DEBATE

Moscow's public reaction to the recent congressional hearings on reduction of U.S. forces in Europe is notable for its almost total lack of criticism of Administration policy. It has given sparse and neutral coverage to the statements opposing reductions at this time made by Defense Secretary Schlesinger, Deputy Secretary of State Rush, and U.S. permanent representative to NATO Rumsfeld. The minimal level of reportage has included, however, selective citations of congressional and private spokesmen calling for an immediate or phased reduction of U.S. forces from Europe. The Soviet military paper, RED STAR, has followed the pattern of the other central Moscow papers and media, restricting its criticism to personalities it could identify with U.S. military "circles," such as General Goodpaster of NATO and Senator Jackson.

Characteristic of Moscow's coverage of the debate was its handling of the detailed report submitted by Senator Mansfield to the Senate Foreign Relations Committee reviewing the development of U.S.-Soviet relations in a favorable light and noting the effects of this development on Europe. A summary of this report printed in PRAVDA on the 27th noted in only one brief sentence that Mansfield also "appealed" for a reduction of U.S. forces in Europe. This hands-off treatment vis-a-vis the Administration stand on force reductions is in stark contrast to the flurry of Soviet comment following the introduction of the Mansfield proposal in May 1971 to halve the number of U.S. troops in Europe by the end of 1971. At that time Moscow took the Administration to task for "torpedoing" the proposal.

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MIDDLE EAST

USSR "DISAPPOINTED" BY U.S. VETO IN SECURITY COUNCIL DEBATE

Moscow gave limited attention to the concluding sessions of the Security Council's general debate on the Middle East, convened in June at Egypt's request and resumed on 20 July after a month's suspension. The eight-nation draft resolution--vetoed by the United States--was described by TASS on the 26th as a "modest and moderate minimum of demands" which called for the withdrawal of Israeli forces from the occupied territories, supported Dr. Jarring's mission, and stressed that a peaceful settlement could be achieved only on the basis of respect for national sovereignty, territorial integrity, the rights of all states in the Middle East region and the "rights and legitimate aspirations" of the Palestinians.

Moscow showed even less disposition to criticize the United States for its use of the veto on 26 July than it did last September, when the first American veto was cast in connection with a Middle East resolution. In the September session, which dealt with Israeli attacks on Lebanon and Syria in the wake of the fedayeen seizure of Israeli athletes at the Olympic games in Munich, Moscow had decried what it called U.S. attempts to justify the Israeli raids by linking them with the Munich incident.* The July veto prompted a mild TASS observation that it showed no U.S. intent to renounce its "prejudiced" support of Israel and embark on "the road of cooperation with other countries" in seeking a solution. TASS noted that the veto "complicated" the Middle East problem and said the delegations participating in the debate were "greatly disappointed."

Comment broadcast in Arabic has rounded up Arab indignation and criticism, claiming that the result of the voting exposed American policy as openly hostile to the Arabs and at the same time it demonstrated the "moral and political isolation" of Israel and its U.S. "protectors." An Arabic-language commentary on the 27th complained that the "negative" U.S. attitude made a solution more difficult, but the broadcast seemed more concerned to assure the Arabs of firm Soviet support, insisting that the USSR would

* Moscow's reaction to the 10 September 1972 veto is discussed in the 13 September 1972 TRENDS, pages 20-21.

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"never under any circumstances enter into bargaining with the imperialists." And a subsequent Arabic-language commentary on the 29th was devoted to a diatribe against the Chinese voting record on Middle East issues in the Security Council, pointing out that Peking did not participate in the recent vote and had failed to support previous resolutions calling for "liquidation of the consequences of Israeli aggression."

Moscow may have been replying to Egyptian President as-Sadat, who explained in a speech on the 26th that China did not vote because it wanted a more powerful resolution "in our favor," and "this means China is with us." TASS briefly reported as-Sadat's criticism of the U.S. action, quoting him as calling the veto part of a "ferocious campaign" to make the Arabs sit at the conference table with "Israel" and let it dictate its terms. As-Sadat in fact also indicated his irritation with Moscow: He referred to a "blockade" by "friends" as well as enemies, and spoke of the "changes we are seeing---blockade, detente, or even not detente but an embracing between the major powers." And he declared that "from here, from Alexandria University, I present this veto, and all that it means in full, to the Soviet Union."

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EXPOSURES OF CORRUPTION SHAKE AGRICULTURAL BUREAUCRACY

The Soviet agricultural complex, which had been relatively resistant to change during most of the post-Khrushchev period, has now been shaken by charges of corruption, inefficiency and conservatism. The exposures of corruption in agricultural agencies last year, which presumably contributed to the February ouster of Matskevich from the agriculture ministry and his replacement by Politburo member Polyanskiy, have escalated into a new scandal involving Deputy Agriculture Minister A. F. Dubrovir. At the same time, agricultural officials were warned against bureaucratic inefficiency and resistance to innovation at a recent conference organized by the CPSU Central Committee and attended by party secretaries of all USSR and RSFSR agricultural agencies. The conference, reported in an early June issue of PARTY LIFE, was supervised by Politburo member Kulakov, the regime's new agricultural whip.

In the latest scandal, reported in a July issue of PARTY LIFE, a Party Control Committee investigation disclosed that the chief of the USSR Agriculture Ministry's administration for experimental rural construction and repair had illegally transferred equipment to his relatives and had illegally authorized the sale of 900,000 rubles' worth of the ministry's building materials and equipment to other agencies. The official, V. M. Kryzhanovskiy, was fired from his job and expelled from the party, while his superior, A. F. Dubrovin, since 1966 the deputy agriculture minister in charge of construction, was fired for illegally allowing such sales. The ministry's party committee was ordered to take action against other officials.

Similar scandals were exposed last year before the demotion of Polyanskiy as first deputy premier and the ouster of Matskevich. A 2 July 1972 PRAVDA satire had exposed the deputy chief of the secretariat of the agriculture ministry for accepting bribes, and a 16 August PRAVDA article reported his expulsion from the party and his arrest. The July article blamed the leaders of the ministry for the abuses, and in the 16 August article Agriculture Minister Matskevich conceded the validity of the charges against his assistant and announced the creation of an inspection unit in the ministry to counter such abuses.

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An October issue of PARTY LIFE carried a report of a Party Control Committee investigation of the RSFSR Agricultural Equipment Association exposing bribery and misuse of state equipment. The deputy chief of the association's main administration for supply of equipment, V. P. Zhavoronkov, was fired from his job and expelled from the party, while the chairman of the association, S. V. Shevchenko, and its party secretary, V. D. Stoyanov, were censured for condoning such acts. PRAVDA on 31 January 1973 announced the ouster of Shevchenko for "violating state discipline," and in a March issue of PARTY LIFE Party Control Committee First Deputy Chairman K. N. Grishin wrote that Shevchenko and his associates had "misused" their positions for private profit.

LIBERALS, CONSERVATIVES CLASH OVER STALIN POLICIES

A debate over the relative merits of the agricultural policies of Stalin and Khrushchev has erupted in recent months. A new novel published in NOVY MIR by liberal writer Fedor Abramov, which bitterly depicts Stalin's postwar exploitation and police repression of the peasants, has been sharply criticized in OKTYABR. At the same time, conservative historians have produced a new study of postwar agriculture which polemicizes with the agricultural histories of the Khrushchev era and vehemently justifies Stalin's policies. The new history, in its harsh condemnation of Khrushchev's agricultural policies, goes beyond Brezhnev's characterization of those policies at the March 1965 CPSU plenum.

ABRAMOV NOVEL Although NOVY MIR has aroused little controversy in recent years, its publication of Abramov's new novel "The Crossroads" in the January and February issues provoked an indignant review in the July issue of OKTYABR. Abramov, whose frank descriptions of village life had earned him harsh criticism in 1963, described life in a northern Russian village in 1950-51 and, in the words of the OKTYABR reviewer, sociologist Vladimir Staroverov, depicted "not poverty but full destitution." Staroverov castigated the novel for implying that Stalin's oppressive tax, combined with negligible pay, robbed the peasants of any incentive to work; for suggesting that the regime resorted to police repression in the person of an "all-powerful" local state security chief who filled the peasants' life with fear of deportation to Siberia; and for depicting all party and soviet officials as "slavedrivers" repressing the peasants out of concern for their own skins. The repression was said to have produced resistance among the peasants who secretly criticized the regime for continuing to blame their poverty on the war.

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Staroverov charged Abramov with "artistic falsehood" and violation of the "truth of life" by presenting only the negative side of peasant life. He sought to refute Abramov by claiming that peasant income had reached the prewar level by the early 1950's, that "the shortage of products had disappeared entirely," that farms were producing more and turning over a smaller share of their production to the state, and that officials were strict but sympathetic toward the peasantry. While acknowledging official admissions of shortcomings and mistakes during the period, Staroverov sought to justify the harsh conditions in the countryside as largely unavoidable.

NEW STALINIST HISTORY

In refuting Abramov's novel, Staroverov cited a new history of Soviet agriculture by I. M. Volkov and Yu. V. Arutyunyan, which apparently represents a more orthodox version of postwar Soviet agriculture. The thrust of the new work, which has yet to reach the West, may be seen in Volkov's lengthy article in the January-February 1973 issue of USSR HISTORY. Volkov specifically condemned Khrushchev-era accounts of agriculture after the war and defended Stalin's agricultural policies. In Volkov's view, the exploitation of farms began to be rectified under Stalin, not under Khrushchev, and the latter's dramatic speech at the September 1953 CPSU plenum merely marked an extension rather than a sharp change of policy.

In embellishing Stalin's policies and blackening Khrushchev's, Volkov clearly departed from Brezhnev's interpretation at the March 1965 plenum, when the party leader divided the Khrushchev era into a good period (1953-58) and a bad period (1959-64). Volkov complained that the existing literature depicts the early Khrushchev period as "nothing but a string of successes without any kind of shortcomings." He questioned the explanation given by the March plenum for the downturn after 1958, stating that the causes "could not have originated suddenly, precisely in 1959." In concluding the article, Volkov lauded the orthodox works on collectivization and more recent policy by Brezhnev's agricultural adviser V. A. Golikov and Brezhnev's protege S. P. Trapeznikov, head of the Central Committee's science and educational institutions section.

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NOTES

SOVIET IMAGE OF THE UNITED STATES: Since the June summit, Soviet media have continued to provide domestic audiences a more positive view of the United States and of Administration policies toward the Soviet Union. PRAVDA's Washington correspondent Strel'nikov, for example, in a 25 July article entitled "Reason Prevails," reported the continuing favorable responses of the U.S. public to improved relations with the USSR and the optimistic views of U.S. businessmen on the prospects for U.S.-Soviet trade. But the virtual embargo on derogatory information about U.S. domestic life which prevailed in the weeks leading up to the summit has in recent days been relaxed. On 25 July, the Washington correspondent of Moscow radio, Yuriy Soltan, filed his first dispatch since well before the summit casting internal developments in a critical light. Soltan observed that the Administration's emergency economic controls affected only U.S. workers while permitting corporate profits to rise freely. The following day, Eduard Baskakov described to domestic listeners the difficult lot of American Indians. At the same time, Moscow has continued to give only minimal, discreet coverage to the Watergate affair.

SOVIET NAVY DAY: Following a pattern established last year after the Moscow summit, official Soviet statements on Navy Day (29 July) paid deference to detente by avoiding the militant themes traditionally associated with Soviet military holidays. The Order of the Day was completely innocuous and contained none of the phrases about "imperialist" aggression and strengthening defense which had been characteristic of the orders for 1969-71. An interview with Admiral Gorshkov published in PRAVDA was similarly bland. While making one brief reference to the goal of "further strengthening our homeland's defenses and naval might," it placed at least equal emphasis on the notion of the navy as an instrument for extending the "horizons of peaceful cooperation."

DRV-POLAND: Warsaw reportage during the DRV party-government delegation's "official visit" to Poland glossed over its aid to the DRV and showed some reluctance to endorse a basic DRV formulation. Warsaw, most notably, failed to follow the lead set by Moscow and Budapest, both of which had announced the cancellation of all previous DRV debts during party-government visits to those capitals. And while VNA reported on 28 July that new agreements on economic and military aid had been

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signed with Poland, the joint statement issued at the end of the visit, as well as reportage in Polish media, said only that "appropriate documents" were signed concerning "economic, scientific, and technical cooperation."

Unlike the Hungarian-DRV communique, which said that "full unanimity of views" had been reached on all issues, the Polish-DRV statement merely noted that talks were held in an atmosphere of "cordiality, fraternal solidarity and mutual understanding." Where the Hungarian communique cited the need to "restore" and consolidate communist unity--a DRV phrase associated with Hanoi's efforts to improve relations among its communist allies--the DRV-Polish statement does not contain this formulation. Moreover, TRYBUNA LUDU's account of Pham Van Dong's speech at a rally on 27 July omitted his call for restoration of communist unity.

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SUPPLEMENTARY ARTICLE

PRC AND SOUTHEAST ASIA: FURTHER EVOLUTION TOWARD BETTER RELATIONS

The visit of a Chinese table tennis delegation to Malaysia, Thailand, and Burma in June and July reflected the ongoing evolution of Peking's efforts to expand normal relations with Southeast Asian states while downplaying involvement with Maoist insurgencies that once were the focus of its policy in the region. Designed to enhance prospects for improved relations with noncommunist governments in an era of Sino-U.S. detente and great-power withdrawal from Indochina, Peking's approach has been one of step-by-step moves to win good will and trust rather than to achieve dramatic breakthroughs. It also accords with the gradualist approach generally taken by the Southeast Asian governments as they undertake to adjust to new realities.

Peking's approach has also enabled it to retain the assets invested in the Maoist CPs in the region. For this purpose, Peking has followed a dual track, cultivating normal relations with local governments while continuing to lend some support to the insurgent parties. While Peking has muted its own association with the insurgents, PRC-based clandestine radios have served as outlets for hardline ideology and attacks on local governments. However, in recent months, including the period of the Chinese ping-pong team's tour, the clandestine radios have gradually moderated their invective against Southeast Asian governments, suggesting the possibility that Peking may be moving toward meeting the objections of those governments to the hostile propaganda purveyed by the clandestine stations.

PRC TEAM'S TOUR Peking gave considerable coverage to the table tennis team's tour, noting for each stop the signs of friendship typical of these exercises in people's diplomacy but sidestepping references to improved state relations. At the first stop, in Malaysia, the team was feted on two occasions by the Malaysian minister of culture in settings described by NCNA as "imbued with warm friendship." NCNA highlighted the minister's remarks on 9 June that Malaysia will send a delegation to the Asian, African, and Latin American table tennis tournament which will be held in Peking this fall. During their stay in Thailand, the Chinese were reported without atmospherics as meeting on 19 June with Marshal Phraphat, identified both as deputy prime minister and president of the Thai Olympic

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Committee. Other meetings in Bangkok included a 21 June farewell banquet attended by Thai Minister of Commerce Prasit, whose visit to Peking last year laid the groundwork for the current thaw in Sino-Thai relations. That reception was described as "friendly." In Burma, the Chinese were reported as meeting with few officials outside sport and cultural circles, though foreign ministry officials were noted in attendance at the PRC embassy reception for the group on 7 July, which took place in "warm and cordial surroundings."

The dual approach was reflected in the contrast between Peking's treatment of the tour and coverage given by the Thai CP's Voice of the People of Thailand (VOPT) and the Malayan CP's Voice of the Malayan Revolution (VOMR). A 17 June VOPT broadcast welcomed the "Chinese people's envoys of peace" and hailed improved bilateral relations as an "historic torrent which no reactionary force can resist," but it also denounced the "Thanom government" for "still pursuing a policy of hostility toward the PRC" and for having acquiesced in the Chinese team's visit only because of the pressure of public opinion. A similar attack on the "Razak clique" marked the VOMR's 28 June report on the team's stay in Malaysia. There was no monitored report on the team's visit to Burma by the other PRC-based clandestine station, the Voice of the People of Burma (VOPB).

MALAYSIA Though some criticism of Southeast Asian leaders by the clandestine stations has persisted, Peking's official media have markedly reduced or eliminated publicity adverse to the local governments, and the clandestine stations have also begun to moderate their attacks. Movement in this direction has been particularly reflected in the case of Malaysia. The Chinese have not only muted past attacks against the Razak government, but have begun to report in a favorable light on Kuala Lumpur's policies. Peking remained silent on Razak's 30 June announcement that PRC-Malaysian talks on diplomatic relations were beginning in New York, but it recently reported other diplomatic moves, including Kuala Lumpur's decision earlier this year to withdraw from ASPAC and its recognition of the North Korean government. The Chinese are also on record as supporting Malaysian and Indonesian efforts to control passage through the Malacca Straits. Notably, Peking began to report favorably on Malaysian internal affairs with a 14 April NCNA dispatch noting a government announcement that Malaysia had achieved self-sufficiency in rice production. Peking's only other favorable reporting on the internal affairs of a Southeast Asian nation concerned Burma--the only government in the area maintaining diplomatic ties with China.

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Chinese pickups from the VOMR have been notably reduced over the past year. Peking has halted replays of VOMR reports on insurgent battle actions, and since the turn of the year has only picked up VOMR comment praising the Vietnam and Laos peace agreements. At the same time, the VOMR itself has reflected a more moderate stance toward the Razak and Lee Kuan Yew governments--its usual targets for attack. Throughout October 1972 the radio refrained from criticising the Malaysian government by name and has since gone for several periods of one or two weeks without mentioning either regime. It has filled its programs with replays of Maoist tracts and occasional attacks against unspecified "puppet cliques" in Kuala Lumpur and Singapore.

BURMA Peking has given substantial publicity to a broadening range of contacts with Burma in diplomatic, economic, and other spheres. Typifying these relations, NCNA's 1 May report on the departure of the PRC ambassador from Rangoon noted that he had "friendly" farewell meetings with Ne Win and San Yu, and that the Burmese foreign minister's remarks at a banquet in his honor stressed the "satisfactory all-round progress in the friendship and cooperation between China and Burma." In a noteworthy change, NCNA on 27 March reported the reception in Peking given by the Burmese military attache to mark his country's armed forces day, an occasion which Peking had previously ignored and which has sensitive implications in view of the Burmese army's troubles with the pro-Peking insurgents. NCNA noted the presence of a PLA deputy chief of staff at the reception.

Peking's last report on a Burmese CP pronouncement appeared almost six months ago when NCNA carried a statement on the Vietnam peace agreement. The party's representative in Peking continues to be noted making infrequent ceremonial appearances, the most recent being his attendance at this year's May Day celebrations reported by NCNA.

The clandestine VOPB, which has never been mentioned in Peking's official media, has sustained a low level of attacks on the Ne Win government by name. Frequently, however, the VOPB mutes its criticism by directing it more vaguely at the "military government." A 15 July broadcast discussed an issue with particular implications for Sino-Burmese relations in accusing the "Ne Win-San Yu military government" of colluding with Kuomintang spies active in areas near the PRC border.

THAILAND Peking's treatment of Thailand has also evolved toward a more moderate stance in the wake of the Sino-Thai thaw last summer. NCNA still occasionally picks up reports from

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the VOPT on the insurgents' battle actions, but critical references to the Thanom government have been appearing only in replays of pronouncements by Sihanouk's front. (In its role as host to Sihanouk's exile government, Peking has put its media in the front's service and has been sparing in editing out passages that diverge from the PRC's line.) The Chinese have muted past criticism of the U.S. military presence in Thailand, but they have not reached the point of reporting favorably on Thai external or internal policies, as they have done with Burma and Malaysia.

The VOPT has maintained an especially active broadcast schedule, originating a new program each day; the VOMR and VOPB present new programs only two or three times a week. The attacks against the Thanom government are notably more severe than the other two stations' criticism of their respective targets, but the VOPT in recent weeks has shown some signs of moderation. In contrast with past programs that were peppered with denunciations of the "Thanom-Praphat clique," recent programs have generally been restricted to one item criticizing the authorities by name. Some programs have refrained altogether from mentioning the Thanom government.

PHILIPPINES, There are no clandestine radios that beam to
INDONESIA the Philippines or to Indonesia under the name of
pro-Peking parties, but several of the indicators of Peking's flexible approach toward the other Southeast Asian nations have been present in its relations with these two states. Thus, there have been no references to the Philippine CP in Peking media this year; the last one was a 5 December 1972 NCNA pickup of a Philippine CP publication's article reporting on the Maoist New People's Army. A 26 September 1972 NCNA article replayed foreign press comment critical of the "Marcos authorities" in connection with the declaration of martial law in the Philippines, and Peking subsequently suspended what had been a growing series of reports publicizing "friendly" exercises in people's diplomacy with the Philippines. However, a revival of that form of diplomacy was reflected in a 5 May NCNA report that Chou En-lai had a "friendly and unconstrained conversation" that day with a visiting Philippine Chamber of Commerce delegation. NCNA noted that the premier asked the delegates to "convey his respects" to President Marcos and "regards to his old friend Carlos P. Romulo."

Peking's last pickup of an Indonesian CP pronouncement was an NCNA replay of a message on the Vietnam agreement that avoided mention of the Suharto government. Publicity for the Indonesian CP's representative in China has been restricted to his appearances on PRC National Day. In addition to expressing support for Djakarta's stance on the Malacca Straits, Peking has also taken note of Indonesia's troubles with the Soviet Union, as in a 29 March NCNA report that Djakarta had canceled Soviet aid projects.

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REGIONAL ISSUES

Apart from movement on bilateral relations, Peking has demonstrated a significantly more forthcoming approach toward initiatives aimed at promoting cooperation among the countries in the area. Though Peking duly cited reports on this year's troubled ASPAC session, noting an Australian observation that "the continued presence of Chiang Kai-shek in ASPAC makes it 'anachronistic,'" a 1 February NCNA report cited passages of an Australian-New Zealand statement that expressed "understanding and support" for the desire of the ASEAN states to limit outside interference in the affairs of Southeast Asia and sympathy for their efforts to make the area a zone of "peace, freedom, and neutrality." Peking has also cited without criticism the continuing work of the Five-Power Pact, has muted criticism of SEATO, and has played up foreign comment on the importance of the ANZUS defense arrangement.

Anti-Soviet concerns have been reflected in Peking's critical coverage of Soviet activities in the region as well as attacks on Moscow by the clandestine radios. Because of widespread neutralist sentiment in the region, Peking has had recourse to rightwing sources for criticism of the Soviets. Thus, a lengthy NCNA report on 23 April replayed comment from the rightwing press in Thailand, Singapore, and Indonesia voicing strong suspicions regarding the Soviet proposal for a collective security system in Asia.

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A P P E N D I X

MOSCOW, PEKING BROADCAST STATISTICS 23 - 29 JULY 1973

Moscow (2711 items)

Award to Ukrainian SSR	(--)	9%
[Brezhnev Speech	(--)	6%]
10th World Youth	(2%)	9%
Festival, Berlin		
Cuba 26 July Anniversary	(--)	7%
Middle East	(2%)	5%
[Egyptian Revolution	(--)	2%]
Anniversary		
China	(4%)	4%
Indochina	(8%)	2%

Peking (1124 items)

Domestic Issues	(57%)	48%
Cambodia	(12%)	12%
[Sihanouk in DPRK	(--)	4%]
Congo President	(--)	9%
Ngouabi in PRC		
20th Anniversary	(--)	6%
Korean War Armistice		
Vietnam	(5%)	4%

These statistics are based on the voicecast commentary output of the Moscow and Peking domestic and international radio services. The term "commentary" is used to denote the lengthy items: radio talk, speech, press article or editorial, government or party statement, or diplomatic note. Items of extensive reportage are counted as commentaries.

Figures in parentheses indicate volume of comment during the preceding week.

Topics and events given major attention in terms of volume are not always discussed in the body of the Trends. Some may have been covered in prior issues; in other cases the propaganda content may be routine or of minor significance.